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Summary  
 
International development policy is ripe for an overhaul. Behavioral science can help 
policymakers to spur changes in behaviors that are difficult to explain from a conventional 
economic perspective and impede economic development. We focus here on two well-
documented, often-coinciding psychological phenomena that have particularly wide-ranging 
implications for development policy: present bias (favoring immediate rewards over long-term 
considerations) and limited attention. We present a number of general policy recommendations 
that are informed by insight into these phenomena and offer concrete examples of how the 
recommendations can be implemented to help low-income individuals improve their lives and 
reach their long-term goals.  
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[Introduction]  
 
How can international development policies induce farmers to adopt improved agricultural 
technologies? Get more parents to vaccinate their children and more patients to comply with 
treatment regimens? Encourage poor people to save more? These seemingly disparate challenges 
have a common feature: insights from behavioral science can help to improve the effectiveness 
of efforts to address them.  
 
For example, the standard rational perspective of classic economic theory would predict that 
offering a higher interest rate should motivate people to save more. A recent field experiment in 
Chile found, however, that a large majority of participants did not increase savings in response to 
this approach, even though interest rates increased substantially, from 0.3% to 5%. By contrast, 
savings almost doubled when subjects were able to announce their savings goals to a self-help 
group and had their progress publicly monitored and rewarded in nonmonetary ways—such as 
praise—at the group’s weekly meetings1. Thus, a basic understanding of even a small number of 
the principles that guide human behavior can help policymakers to alter behaviors that make 
little sense from a conventional economic perspective and pose challenges to economic 
development. 
 
We discuss two well-studied psychological phenomena that have wide-ranging implications for 
international development policy: “present bias” and limited attention.  For clarity, we begin by 
explaining the two separately, although both operate in many of the situations we will discuss.  
 
 
 
Present bias deters investing in the future 
 
Investing in the future is critical to people’s well-being. Examples include saving to buy business 
supplies without paying exorbitant interest rates to a money lender; investing in fertilizer to 
improve next year’s crop yield; sending children to school, or traveling to get preventative 
medical care. These examples might sound like obvious steps to take, but behavioral science 
reveals that people often fail to expend a smaller amount of money, time or effort now to obtain 
much larger benefits in the future. When it comes to trading off between immediate and future 
outcomes, such decisions depend on the relative weight one assigns to the near- and far-term 
results. The immediate pull of temptation often keeps people from making the optimal choices 
they say they would have made when asked to reflect on those decisions when not under the 
immediate influence of temptation; present bias—over-weighting short-term versus long-term 
rewards--gets in the way.  
 
And the deviation from optimality occurs frequently: in the abstract, people often prefer to make 
the long-run investment but then get tempted in the moment to take the immediate benefit, only 
to regret it later.2 For example, a parent who knows she should be saving for her child’s school 
fees might falter and purchase a tempting meal right now when she is hungry. Conversely, a 
small but unpleasant obstacle right now can have a large influence on decisions: a parent might 
want to vaccinate her child but the prospect of a long hot walk to the clinic (when she doesn’t 
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know for sure that the clinic will even be open), might lead her to procrastinate—perhaps 
indefinitely.  
 
People often realize that they are susceptible to present bias and will sometimes take elaborate 
steps to protect themselves from succumbing to short-term temptations.3, 4 They may choose, for 
instance, to lock their money away where they can’t access it for some pre-determined period5. 
Some people may even pay for this restriction on their freedom, accepting a lower interest rate 
on money they can’t easily access on a whim.  
 
Present bias is common to those in rich and poor countries alike.6 Behavioral scientists have not 
only documented the phenomenon, they have worked with international development experts and 
policy-makers to design programs that take it into account. Many of these programs have been 
rigorously tested and proved to be effective at changing behavior in ways that lead to positive 
long-run outcomes.  
 
Limited attention impairs decision making 
 
To understand poverty, one must recognize that its defining features—the shortage of money, 
time, and basic necessities such as sleep and food—affect psychological functioning in non-
obvious ways that can undermine poor people’s ability to escape their circumstances. This is true 
even when policies or programs are implemented that, in principle, provide sufficient 
opportunities for people to pull themselves out of poverty. All of us have limited attentional 
bandwidth, but wealthy people, freed from having to spend a lot of attention on acquiring food, 
shelter and other basics, have more attention available for handling unexpected hassles and 
making strategic decisions to improve their circumstances. In contrast, the challenge of 
navigating everyday life when one lacks adequate resources is enormous. Poor people are often 
left with little or no spare attentional capacity to devote to such important things as remembering 
to take their pills every day or navigating the complicated bureaucratic process to qualify for an 
assistance program. Making matters worse, poverty directly affects the environment where 
people live, often creating additional attentional demands. For example, lack of access to such 
basic services as piped water, electricity, child care, and affordable financial services adds 
numerous daily decisions, challenging already scarce attentional bandwidth further.7, 8  
 
Principles for Policymakers 
 
In general, policies aimed at serving the poor will be more effective if they alleviate the 
difficulties imposed by present bias and constrained attention—both of which, although equally 
pervasive across humanity, take a greater toll on the well-being of those experiencing scarcity 
than on those who are wealthier. Next, we discuss several policy strategies that can achieve this 
goal and provide evidence of their effectiveness in a range of sectors.   
 
1) Reduce the upfront cost of future-oriented behavior. 
 
Everyone has some tendency to procrastinate; we delay doing what we know is in our long-term 
interest because we usually have no compelling reason to bear the upfront cost today rather than 
putting it off to tomorrow. The narrowing of attention produced by poverty—focusing on 
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immediately pressing needs to the exclusion of other important but less urgent needs8—
aggravates this natural present bias. As a result, even minor upfront costs, such as small 
copayments at doctor’s offices, inconvenience, or the need to expend effort, can be important 
barriers to investment in future well-being.   
 
A key practical policy lesson that flows from this understanding is to reduce, and ideally abolish, 
the upfront cost of obtaining health products that offer substantial benefits at reasonable prices 
but go underutilized. Fifteen randomized trials show dramatic increases in uptake in response to 
even small reductions in prices for products such as insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) for 
avoiding mosquito-borne diseases, dilute chlorine for disinfecting drinking water, and 
deworming tablets.9 This principle helped catalyze large-scale distribution of free ITNs in sub 
Saharan Africa, which is estimated to have saved 4 million lives since 2000.10 But there is room 
to do the same for many other low-cost prophylactic products that are known to have the 
potential to produce cost-effective improvements in well-being in the developing world if they 
were in wider use.  
 
Likewise, reducing the upfront costs associated with education could yield outsized benefits. One 
study illustrating this point found that providing free school uniforms to students in Kenya at a 
cost to the state of $6, a small fraction of the total cost of a child’s education, led to a 6.4%  
increase in school attendance.11 Helping countries reduce or eliminate school fees and giving 
vouchers for free school uniforms are practical and straightforward policies that could improve 
school enrollment in places where it is low. 
 
Beyond reducing fees for long-term investments, minimizing or eliminating what might seem 
like trivial inconveniences can dramatically increase the uptake of services.  This approach could 
include reducing or simplifying paper work (or better yet: instituting automatic enrollment in 
programs), minimizing travel times required to take advantage of programs, and helping with 
childcare and transportation. In one instance, helping households to fill out the application for an 
interest-free loan to cover the cost of piped water in Morocco increased participation from 10% 
to 69%12. (This jump mirrors the US finding that helping families fill in FAFSA forms for 
federal student aid increased low-income students’ college attendance rate by 24 %13).  
 
The need to travel even modest distances (more than a 10- to 15-minute walk) is another type of 
inconvenience that can powerfully dampen service uptake. In Malawi, the likelihood that people 
would show up to receive the results of an HIV test fell sharply as the distance they needed to 
travel increased by even a small amount.14 Similarly, in Kenya, the likelihood that people would 
take advantage of protected water springs that reduce the risk of diarrhea fell with small 
increases in the distance they had to travel to reach the water.15  
 
Because price and inconvenience are both barriers to investing in future well-being, policy 
makers should think carefully about the tradeoffs between them. One might assume that the poor 
would be willing to endure significant inconvenience to avoid even a small financial cost for 
services, but this assumption has a serious flaw: it fails to appreciate that overcoming 
inconvenience requires attention (such as for planning and solving logistical challenges) that 
poor people cannot spare. So, it can sometimes be better to charge a small fee and make a service 
very convenient than to charge nothing for a very inconvenient service.  
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This point is illustrated by the success of a nonprofit entrepreneurial program for delivering 
preventive health products in rural Uganda. A randomized evaluation found impressive 
community health gains when women sold underused health products, such as insecticide-treated 
bed nets, water purification tablets, and anti-malarial drugs, door to door at a discounted (but 
nonzero) price, eliminating the hassle of seeking these products out.16  
 
Charging a bit to reduce inconvenience is a very promising approach that deserves to be scaled 
up. Notably, it could be expanded to improve maternal and child health broadly, because travel is 
particularly difficult for pregnant women and those with young infants. Ideally all pregnant 
women would undergo at least one prenatal checkup (to assess risk factors, and to encourage 
involvement of a trained birth attendant) and all infants would receive basic immunizations. 
Evidence suggests that use of such services would increase dramatically if they were provided 
within villages, or at least at coordinated central locations with transportation made easy and 
cheap (e.g. a teen helper coming to the woman’s door to accompany her). Conversely, in 
situations where logistical constraints require that services be provided at less convenient 
locations, small (but immediate) material incentives (e.g., a bag of lentils and a set of metal 
plates) can be an effective way to offset inconvenience. In Rajasthan, India, free lentils increased 
immunization rates in rural Rajasthan from 6% to 39%.17  
 
2) Time the delivery of subsidies for when people are most likely to be receptive  
 
Both present bias and limited attention suggest that the timing of interventions can be critically 
important in ways that are not obvious from a traditional economic perspective. For example, 
sugar cane farmers in India typically receive their income once a year at the time of harvest and 
therefore tend to be relatively rich right after the harvest and relatively poor right before it. In a 
powerful illustration of both the attentional costs of poverty and of the importance of timing, a 
recent study documented that those farmers perform worse on tests of mental concentration in 
the period immediately before the harvest, when money is tight. The difference in scores 
translates to roughly 10 IQ points.18  
 
Traditionally, the timing of subsidies has been determined arbitrarily, presumably on the 
assumption that a subsidy delivered now is at least as useful as a subsidy delivered later. But 
recent evidence from behavioral science and development research indicates that this approach 
misses an opportunity to enhance uptake; it would be more effective to give subsidies at times 
when people are most likely to have the attentional bandwidth needed to think about and take full 
advantage of them. It seems probable, for instance, that the low-income sugar cane farmers 
would be in a better mental state to evaluate and accept a beneficial offer immediately after the 
harvest, when they face fewer other pressing demands.  
Aligning the timing of subsidies with the timing of important decisions or expenses is another 
effective strategy. In Tanzania, promoters of health insurance deliberately went to the 
distribution points of a cash transfer program to sign people up for health insurance when they 
received the transfers (and therefore had greater liquidity). This deliberate timing contributed to a 
nearly 20% increase in the use of health insurance.19 Similarly, farmers respond more favorably 
to promotion of agricultural products (such as fertilizer and hybrid seeds) if approached at 
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harvest time, when they have money available for those investments and when their attentional 
capacity is not overly taxed by the need to grapple with scarce financial resources. Finally, 
subsidies to encourage education could be timed to coincide with when school fees are due. In a 
recent demonstration of the value of this approach, a program in Bogota, Columbia, that offered 
cash conditionally in exchange for re-enrolling children in school produced higher rates of re-
enrollment when a portion of the monthly transfer was postponed until just before the re-
enrollment period. Moreover, this time-sensitive design was particularly effective for those who 
needed it the most (and who were most likely be facing scarce liquidity and attention): the lowest 
income students and those with the lowest participation rates.20 To maximize effectiveness, such 
programs should give parents advance notice of the subsidy and/or help with planning and 
budgeting to ensure that they have money available to pay for expenses beyond those covered by 
the subsidy. 
 
 
3) Offer programs that lock in or otherwise increase commitments to savings. 
 
People are often well aware that temptation or distraction at critical moments can derail their 
pursuit of long-term goals. As a result, to keep themselves on track, they may be willing—even 
eager—to subject themselves to costly penalties for failing to stick to their goals.21 African 
farmers living in poverty offer an example of how such “commitment savings” approaches can 
be made to work. Impoverished farmers sometimes underuse technologies that they say they 
want and know can increase profits. This is probably in part because they get paid at harvest but 
do not need hybrid seed and fertilizer until months later; holding onto their money that long can 
be hard. Offering a small, time-limited discount on the cost of acquiring fertilizer (such as free 
delivery) right after harvest, when money is relatively plentiful, is a form of commitment savings 
that has been found to increase purchase rates of fertilizers in Kenya by 11 percentage points.22  
Estimates suggest that, to produce a similar purchase rate later on, when fertilizer would 
normally be bought, a 50% subsidy of the purchase price would be needed.  
 
At times, people will take elaborate steps to protect themselves from succumbing to short-term 
temptations. They may choose, for instance, to lock their money away where they cannot access 
it for some pre-determined period. Some people may even pay for this restriction on their 
freedom, accepting a lower interest rate on money they cannot easily access on a whim.  
 
One concern with commitment devices is that they come at a cost: locking money away means it 
is not available for unanticipated but genuinely important expenses. This worry can prevent 
people from taking advantage of commitment devices or can constrain people’s ability to cope if 
they do commit and then an urgent situation arises. An alternative, inspired by work on the 
theory of mental accounting, is soft commitments, such as labeling a savings account for 
particular expenditures (like education), without a strict constraint on how it actually can be 
spent.23 In a recent study in Uganda, researchers compared a program in which saved money 
could only be used for educational expenses to a program in which the savings were encouraged 
but not required to go to education (i.e. it was possible simply to withdraw the cash). In both 
cases, families saved more and spent more on education supplies than a control group did. But 
families saved most in the latter case, when they knew they could still withdraw the money if 
they needed to. 24 
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Thus, making commitment devices available (and easy to use) can be an effective tool—and 
indeed one that is sought out by individuals because they recognize their susceptibility to short-
term temptation, poor planning, and distraction—especially at times of peak demand on their 
limited attentional resources. These tools are, however, not useful for all individuals, and softer 
commitments, such as earmarking an account for particular expenses, may be preferable in 
situations when more flexibility is required. 
  
4) Introduce cognitive aids.  
 
Because poor people often have to attend to multiple pressing needs at the same time, the limits 
of their attention are continually strained.8 Thus, it is not surprising that they may be more likely 
than others to miss crucial information or forget to take intended actions that could improve their 
welfare. Sometimes, statements explicitly pointing out what might seem obvious to a person not 
suffering from attentional scarcity can make a big difference. In a recent study, experienced 
seaweed farmers in Indonesia had noticed that the spacing between their seaweed strands 
affected their yield, so they paid attention to the spacing when planting the strands. But the 
farmers failed to notice that the size of the strands they planted also affected their yield, even 
though the lower yield was easily observable. Consequently, they did not consider strand size in 
farming decisions and did not even know what the size of the strands they used was. The study 
showed that merely offering farmers the opportunity to observe how researchers varied the size 
of the strands and the effect of that variable on yield was not enough for farmers to notice the 
relationship. Only when researchers explicitly pointed out the relationship between strand size 
and yield did farmers notice it and change their practices.25 This result has nothing to do with the 
intelligence of the farmers. A fact is only obvious if the observer has the spare attentional 
capacity to notice it. 26  
 
Simple reminders are another type of straightforward cognitive aid that can be surprisingly 
beneficial. We all sometimes forget to do things we mean to do—take our pills, mail the rent 
check. But, perhaps unsurprisingly, when our attention is overtaxed, we are even less likely to 
follow through with intended actions. When people’s attention is completely taken up with 
pressing demands, they are unlikely to step back and ask themselves whether they are forgetting 
to do something. A policy problem that exemplifies this worsened “intention-action gap” when 
bandwidth is constrained is the incomplete adherence to medical treatment regimens for 
conditions like tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS. In the case of HIV, patients commonly receive a one-
month supply of pills and must remember to take those pills every day. Even when patients 
understand and genuinely intend to adhere to their treatment, they often forget amidst the chaos 
of other pressing demands on their attention. The consequences of such forgetting can be life-
threatening, but a simple fix can help. For example, research in rural Kenya demonstrated that 
the percentage of HIV patients who achieved perfect or near-perfect adherence (i.e., at least 
90%) during the nearly yearlong study period increased from 40% to 53% when they received 
weekly text-message reminders.27  
 
Similarly, although breastfeeding is considered the best practice (especially since high-quality 
infant formula and clean water are not available in much of the developing world), competing 
responsibilities--such as household chores or caring for older children—can make keeping it up 
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difficult. Simple cognitive aids can help, including, for example, physical reminders such as 
stickers on bottles that note the bottles are appropriate primarily for older infants and toddlers. 
 
Sometimes aids that might seem unnecessary to a person whose attention is not overwhelmed 
can be enormously helpful to a someone whose attention is overwhelmed. Simple actions, like 
pointing out well-known facts at the right time or sending well-timed reminders, can be 
important tools to improve decision making among the poor. Reminder messages in particular 
have been delivered in field experiments by text message, email, postcard, letter, phone, and in-
person survey. They have been shown to improve a wide range of outcomes, including saving 
rates in Uganda,24 loan repayment in Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines,28,29 compliance with 
obligatory child support payments in the US,30 vaccination in rural Guatemala,31 use of water 
treatment products in Kenya,32,33 and payment of delinquent fines in the UK.34 But reminders 
must not be too frequent or they risk crossing the line from useful aid to additional drain on 
limited attention.27 Also, they are likely to be especially effective for irregular events, such as 
immunization visits, where people are less able to form a habit. 
 
 
A Need for Experimentation 
 
A couple of issues relating to these strategies merit consideration. When tested, certain minor 
variations often work better than others—sometimes in ways and for reasons that would have 
been difficult to anticipate without testing. This not only suggests the need for more 
experimentation but also underscores the sometimes-surprising impact of subtle design features. 
For example, not all reminders are equally effective. Although weekly messages worked very 
well for HIV treatment adherence in rural Kenya, an alternative design with daily messages did 
not affect adherence (presumably because too-frequent messages are ignored—or worse, become 
an added cognitive burden).27 Additional research is needed to provide generalizable rules of 
thumb for design issues including timing, length, and frequency of reminders; mode of delivery; 
content; and framing of messages. But, even with more research, general rules can offer only 
limited guidance about the optimal implementation of a policy. It is often difficult to predict how 
cultural differences and unobserved variation between contexts might influence the effect of 
even a well-researched treatment. Thus, wherever feasible, any new policy applying behavioral 
principles should be evaluated rigorously in the context in which it is meant to be implemented 
before being deployed at scale (as should all new policies). 
 
A second issue is that, although many findings demonstrate that the strategies listed here have 
had significant impacts in the short run, little is known about how long the effects last. This 
uncertainty is immaterial where the goal is to encourage one-off actions, such as when sending a 
one-time reminder to get  children vaccinated. It is more of a concern where the effectiveness of 
a policy or program depends on people taking sustained, repeated action to form a new habit, as 
is the case when daily reminders are sent with the intention of increasing compliance to long-
term medical regimens. Further research is needed to clarify the long-term effects of some of 
these techniques.  
 
Policymakers are in an ideal position to conduct much of this research. Often, they are mandated 
to implement specific programs in specified settings and populations, which seems to leave little 
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room for experimentation of the type described above. But, because many of these interventions 
are inexpensive or free to implement, behavioral interventions can often be layered on top of 
existing programs. For instance, automated reminder text messages can be sent in bulk at 
extremely low cost. So, an existing program to promote vaccination (such as a vaccination camp) 
could easily and cheaply add text reminders in a randomly chosen subset of the target population 
and then compare the vaccination rate in the groups that did and did not receive the reminders. 
 
Other messaging interventions can be added to existing programs in similarly straightforward 
ways, especially when the program already includes communication with potential recipients. 
For instance, it is trivial to add a request for a soft commitment to an existing interaction with the 
recipient. Similarly, tests of optimal intervention timing can often be conducted without 
additional cost if programs are rolled out over a period of time. If, say, fertilizer discounts are 
already being made available to farmers, policymakers might be in a position to vary the timing 
at which these discounts are announced in randomly selected areas and thereby learn about the 
differential impact of the program as a function of offer timing.35 (This approach is a specific 
example of a more general method, called phase-in design, for achieving randomization even when 
programs are to be delivered to every household or individual in a particular area.) Such “piggy-
backing” of behavioral-intervention tests on existing programs would allow even policymakers 
with strong and inflexible implementation mandates to discover techniques that could improve 
the effectiveness of their existing programs.  
 
Policymakers need to experiment, but they also need to be aware of their own biases. Like other 
humans, they have limited attentional bandwidth and often devote too little thought to decisions 
because they think they already know the answer or because their own cultural, political, or 
moral perspective constrains their thinking in ways they might not even notice. Indeed, even 
technically-trained professionals at the World Bank were shown recently to make more mistakes 
when evaluating data that were presented as referring to a controversial topic in their field than 
they did when the same data were framed as referring to a neutral topic.36 Relatedly, personal 
predispositions might lead some policymakers to presume that behavioral interventions are 
ineffective, and others to see those same interventions as a “silver bullet” solution for all 
problems. The truth lies somewhere in-between and is considerably more nuanced. Nevertheless, 
it is now clear that behavioral interventions are a valuable tool that, when combined with more 
conventional policy tools—such as regulation, education and training, standard economic 
incentives, and infrastructure—can help ameliorate poverty and improve well-being.  
 
 
The Long View 
 
Living in poverty puts additional, often overwhelming, demands on a person’s attention. This 
attentional burden can intensify present bias and otherwise impair decision making, causing the 
poor to miss opportunities to improve their situation. Behavioral insights suggest techniques to 
lessen the negative impact of this “attentional tax” on the poor. These techniques often 
complement more traditional approaches. Applications of the principles outlined here offer 
tremendous promise for improving the effectiveness of development programs.
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Recommended policy strategy 
Psychological 
phenomenon behind 
recommendation 
Sample policies (including relevant citations)
Reduce the upfront cost of future-
oriented behavior 
     Present Bias and 
Limited Attention 
 Reduce or abolish co-payments for underutilized 
insecticide-treated bed nets, hand soap, or family planning products
 Reduce logistical hurdles and, where relevant, the potential embarrassment 
associated with the uptake of preventive health and family planning
organizing entrepreneurs to sell such products (at discounted prices) door to door
increasing convenience and privacy16 
 Reduce bureaucratic hurdles to program uptake through automatic enrollment or 
simplified paperwork12 
 Reduce travel times to take advantage of programs 
either by providing such services within villages, or by organizing easy, low
transportation to central locations15 
Time subsidies for when people are most 
likely to be receptive, such as when they 
are making important decisions or 
outlays 
Present Bias and Limited 
Attention 
 Offer beneficial but high-cost products or services (e.g., health insurance) at times 
when people have greater liquidity (e.g., right after a cash transfer) and more spare 
attentional capacity to evaluate offers19  
 Align timing of cash transfers to encourage school enrollment wit
school fees are due20 
Offer programs that that lock in or 
otherwise facilitate savings 
Present Bias and Limited 
Attention 
 Incentivize the purchase of farming technologies (e.g., fertilizer, hybrid seed) 
immediately after the harvest, alleviating the need for farmers to save money from 
the harvest until the next year’s planting season22
 When worries about the inflexibility of hard commitments discourages participation, 
offer soft commitments, such as savings programs that are earmarked for specific 
expenses (e.g., education) but still allow the savings to be used for other purposes 
Introduce cognitive aids Limited Attention 
 Provide text, email, postcard, letter, or phone reminders of the need for important 
actions such as taking HIV medication, contributing to savings accounts
treatment products20, 27, 32, 33 
Box caption 
Behavioral research suggests several general policy strategies that can enhance the effectiveness 
of development programs. The table summarizes the strategies recommended in this article and 
the psychological phenomena they are meant to address, and it lists examples of specific policies 
that align with the recommended strategies.  
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